Advance reservation (AR) services form a pillar of several branches of the economy, including transportation, lodging, dining, and, more recently, cloud computing. In this work, we use game theory to analyze a slotted AR system in which customers differ in their lead times. For each given time slot, the number of customers requesting service is a random variable following a general probability distribution. Based on statistical information, the customers decide whether or not to make an advance reservation of server resources in future slots for a fee. We prove that only two types of equilibria are possible: either none of the customers makes AR or only customers with lead time greater than some threshold make AR. Our analysis further shows that the fee that maximizes the provider's profit may lead to other equilibria, one of which yields zero profit. In order to prevent ending up with no profit, the provider can elect to advertise a lower fee yielding a guaranteed but smaller profit. We refer to the ratio of the maximum possible profit to the maximum guaranteed profit as the price of conservatism. When the number of customers is a Poisson random variable, we prove that the price of conservatism is one in the single-server case, but can be arbitrarily high in a many-server system.
INTRODUCTION
Advance reservation services play a key role in several branches of the economy, such as transportation, lodging, dining, and health care. There has also been growing interest in applying advance reservation (AR) in cloud computing systems [Sotomayor 2009 ]. For instance, the Moab Workload Manager 1 and IBM Platform Computing Solutions 2 support AR. In both of these packages, an administrator can decide whether or not to enable AR and define an AR pricing scheme. In most systems supporting AR, customers can choose whether to make an AR or not. Since the payoff of each customer is affected by decisions of other customers, it is natural to analyze the behavior of such systems as strategic games.
In this article, we study a set of strategic noncooperative games, referred to as advance reservation games, where players (customers) can reserve future resources in advance for a fee. Charging a reservation fee is a common practice in different venues and is also used in cloud computing. For example, the Amazon EC2 cloud offers reserved instance service, in which customers pay a fee that allows them to use resources later on for a lower cost.
Typically, advance reservations are offered when customers are sensitive to the service starting point and will not agree to wait if service is not available when needed. Accordingly, we consider a loss system where customers leave the system if they cannot get service at their desired time slots. In cloud computing, this typically occurs when parallel computing is needed [Sotomayor 2009 ]. We assume that the service time is slotted, which is a common assumption in the literature of AR [Charbonneau and Vokkarane 2012] due to the complexity of analyzing a continuous time queue that supports AR.
In loss systems, customers have a clear incentive of making an AR to increase their chances to get service. Likewise, the provider is also motivated to offer AR, since he or she can increase overall profit by charging an appropriate reservation fee. Upon deciding whether to make an AR or not, customers face two uncertainties. The first uncertainty lies in the number of customers competing for the same set of resources in a given slot. We refer to this number as the demand, which is a random variable following a general probability distribution.
The second uncertainty lies in the time at which other customers consider making an AR. In the models introduced in this article, customers differ by their lead times, where the lead time of a customer is the time elapsing between the point when he or she realizes that he or she will need service at a given time slot and the starting time of that slot. The lead times of customers are continuous i.i.d. random variables that follow a general distribution but remain private (i.e., customers know the statistics but do not know the realizations of the demand and the lead times of other customers).
To illustrate the model, consider the following example: a system with several servers has a slot duration that lasts for one day, starting at 12:00 AM. A customer realizes on Monday at 6:00 PM that he or she will need service on Wednesday. Thus, his lead time is 30 hours. Upon realizing that service will be needed on Wednesday, the customer can either reserve that slot in advance or avoid AR. The customer does not know how many other customers wish to be served on that day. However, statistical information is available to him.
The model assumes a monopolistic setting. Thus, the provider can choose any AR price and AR mechanism that maximizes his or her expected profit. The profit has two sources: AR fees and service fees. Since customers only decide on whether to make an AR or not, their decisions have no impact on the number of customers getting service in a given slot (their decisions only impact who get service). Hence, the provider can ignore the profit obtained from service when choosing the AR price and AR mechanism. For brevity, henceforth, profit means AR profit. We note that reservation fees are a major source of revenue in several booking systems, including cloud computing [Aazam and Huh 2015] .
In this article, we evaluate different types of AR games and derive their Nash equilibria (we only consider symmetric equilibria, a common assumption made in the literature of queueing games [Hassin and Haviv 2003] ). For the games under consideration, we prove that only two types of equilibria are possible: either none of the customers makes an AR or only customers with lead time greater than some threshold make an AR.
3 Furthermore, we show that, at equilibrium, informing customers that free servers are available does not impact the provider's expected profit. However, charging an AR fee from all customers attempting AR (i.e., not only those granted service) can only decrease the expected profit.
Once a mechanism is chosen, another question arises: what is the AR fee that maximizes the provider's expected profit? The answer to this question turns out to be more complicated. We show that there exists a range of fees, such that choosing a fee within this range leads to multiple equilibria, with one of them yielding zero profit. Therefore, in order to properly set the AR fee, the provider should consider both the fee yielding the maximum possible profit and the fee yielding the maximum guaranteed profit. For this purpose, we introduce the concept of price of conservatism (PoC), which corresponds to the ratio of the maximum possible profit to the maximum guaranteed profit. We assume that the demand follows a Poisson distribution and derive the price of conservatism in different settings. First, we analyze the case of a single server, where we prove that PoC = 1 (i.e., no loss). Next, we conduct the analysis of a many-server system and prove that the price of conservatism can be arbitrarily high. This situation occurs when the system is slightly overloaded.
We note that since AR games are zero-sum games, the social welfare (i.e., the total payoff of all players in the game, including the provider) is not affected by the decisions of the provider and customers. Therefore, the price of anarchy [Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou 1999] in such games always equals one. In contrast, the price of conservatism measures the loss of profit from the viewpoint of the provider.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. In the next section, we cover related work. In Section 3, we describe the different models. In Section 4, we analyze each model and find the equilibria structure. In Section 5, we compare between the expected profits of the different models. In Section 6, we define the Price of Conservatism and compute it for different system sizes. Finally, in Section 7, we conclude and suggest directions for future research.
RELATED WORK
Queueing systems and communication networks that support advance reservations have extensively been researched for the past two decades. Most of the research focuses on performance evaluation and algorithmic aspects of AR systems. For example, Smith et al. [2000] propose a scheduling model that supports AR and evaluate several performance metrics. Kaushik et al. [2006] suggest an AR model with a flexible time window and show that this model has a lower blocking probability and a higher utilization than a model without a window. Guérin and Orda [2000] analyze the effect of AR on the complexity of path selection. Virtamo [1992] evaluates the impact of advance reservations on server utilization. Buyya et al. [2009] report a simulation-based comparison between different payment mechanisms. Cohen et al. [2009] propose algorithms for network routing that support advance channel reservations. For a survey on the field, see Charbonneau and Vokkarane [2012] .
Research on advance reservations can also be found in the literature on revenue management. For example, Liberman and Yechiali [1978] analyze a hotel reservation system where overbooking is allowed and the goal is to find the optimal overbooking level. Reiman and Wang [2008] propose an admission control strategy for a reservation system with different classes of customers. Bertsimas and Shioda [2003] propose a policy for accepting/rejecting restaurant reservations.
The application of game theory to analyze customers' behavior in queues (shortly, queueing games) is pioneered by Naor [1969] . In that paper, the author considers an M/M/1 queue, where customers observe the queue length and then decide whether to join or bulk. Follow-up work analyzed the behavior of customers in other queueing models. Edelson and Hilderbrand [1975] analyze an unobservable M/M/1 queue, where customers decide whether to join or bulk without knowing the queue state. Altman and Shimkin [1998] analyze an observable processor sharing system, where customers decide whether or not to join after observing the number of users in the system. Balachandran [1972] analyzes an observable M/M/1 queue with priorities, where customers decide on a payment and accordingly priorities are assigned. Haviv et al. [2010] analyze an unobservable M/M/N/N system that is initially empty and customers decide whether to join or bulk based on their arrival time. Jain et al. [2011] introduce concert queueing games, where customers, interested in early service with minimal wait, choose their arriving time into a system with a specific opening time. Haviv and Roughgarden [2007] analyze an unobservable system with nonidentical servers, where customers wish to minimize their waiting time and select a server accordingly.
Several models of queueing games focus on revenue management. In those games, a provider designs the system such that his or her revenue will be maximized. For example, Masuda and Whang [2006] assume that the pricing scheme is controlled by the provider and the goal is to find a pricing scheme that maximizes the provider's profit. Such types of games are a special case of Stackelberg games. In a Stackelberg game, a leader (a provider, for instance) acts first, and followers (customers, for instance) respond to the leader's move. In our work, we follow a similar approach, where the objective of the provider is to maximize his or her revenue from AR fees. For a review on the field of queueing games, see Hassin and Haviv [2003] .
THE MODELS
First, we describe the assumptions that are common to all three models:
(1) The system consists of N servers.
(2) The service time axis is slotted. That is, in each slot, customers are served from the beginning till the end of the slot. (3) The demand, which represents the number of customers that request service in a specific slot (each customer requests one server), is a random variable. This formulation is common for slotted queues (e.g., Kang and Tan [1993] and Blanchet et al. [2009] ). The demand for slot i is denoted by D i . (4) Customers that do not get service in a given slot do not make another trial (a common assumption in the literature of loss systems [Ross 1995] ). Thus, the demand in each slot is independent of the history and follows a general distribution supported in N. (5) The customers of each slot differ by the time elapsing between considering making an AR (i.e., realizing that service will be needed in that future slot) and the slot starting time. We refer to this time interval as the lead time of a customer. The lead times of all customers are independent and identically distributed random variables, supported in R + , with cumulative distribution function denoted F (·). (6) Each customer chooses one of two actions: to make an AR or not make an AR, denoted AR and AR , respectively. (7) If the demand for a slot is larger than N, the servers are allocated to the first N customers that made an AR. If fewer than N customers made an AR, the remaining servers are arbitrarily allocated between the customers that did not make an AR. (8) The customers and the provider know the number of servers N and statistical information on the system (i.e., the distribution of the demand and the lead times). (9) The provider charges a fixed reservation fee, denoted C. All the customers have the same utility U from the service. Without loss of generality, we set U = 1. Figure 1 illustrates the model. The models analyzed in this article differ in their reservation mechanisms as follows: Fig. 1 . Slotted system with two servers. The demand for each slot is independent. The demand for slots 1, 2, and 3, is, respectively, 3, 2, and 2. 
(1) Unobservable model 1: Customers have no information regarding the availability of servers at the time of reservation. If a customer makes an AR request, he or she is then informed whether a server will be allocated at the requested slot or not. In the first case, a reservation fee is charged. In the second case, the customer leaves the system with no gain or cost. (2) Unobservable model 2: As in model 1, customers have no information regarding the availability of servers at the time of reservation. In this model, however, a reservation fee is charged from each customer that makes an AR request. (3) Observable model: Customers are informed, prior to their decision, if a server is available at their requested time slot. A customer that has been informed that there is no free server leaves the system.
We note that, in the observable model, customers leave the system if they see that no server is available. Thus, a situation where a customer pays the AR fee but does not get service does not exist in that model.
The possible payoffs of the three models are summarized in Table I .
EQUILIBRIA ANALYSIS

Classification of the Equilibria
We analyze the three models as noncooperative games where each player (customer) aims to maximize his or her payoff. Since the demand for each slot is an i.i.d random variable, the analysis of a single slot is sufficient for analyzing the game. Since we only consider one slot, we simply denote the demand by D. Any fee greater than or equal to one has a trivial result where none of the customers makes an AR. No fee or a negative fee has the trivial result of all customers making an AR. Hence, in our analysis, we consider only fees between zero and one (i.e., 0 < C < 1).
We note that the demand seen by a customer may be different from that seen by an external observer (the provider, for instance). Indeed, the fact that a customer seeks service in a given time slot affects his or her estimation of the number of other customers seeking service in that time slot. On the one hand, a customer is more likely to fall in a slot with large demand than in one with small demand. On the other hand, the customer must exclude himself or herself. This phenomenon is known as the discrete case of the waiting time paradox (or residual life paradox). We defineD as the number of customers seen by a customer besides himself or herself. The probability distribution function (PDF) ofD is known to be [Avineri 2004 ]
The following lemma states that each customer makes his or her decision upon realizing that service is required.
LEMMA 4.1. For all customers, making an AR when realizing that service is required yields at least the same payoff as making an AR later on.
PROOF. In all three models, if a customer makes an AR when all servers are already reserved, his or her payoff will be the same as if making an AR later on. If a customer makes an AR when there is at least one free server, his or her payoff will be 1 − C. If a customer makes a reservation at a later point, his or her payoff will be the same if there is still at least one free server. If there is no more server available, his or her payoff will be zero in the first and third models and negative in the second model. Given a lead time γ , we set t = F (γ ) and refer to it as the normalized lead time. Due to the probability integral transformation theorem [Dodge 2006, p. 320] , we know that t is a random variable, uniformly distributed in [0, 1] . Note that F (γ ) is also the average fraction of customers with lead time smaller than γ . Figure 2 illustrates the notion of the normalized lead time.
For each game, we define a strategy function σ : t → [0, 1], which represents the probability that a tagged customer with normalized lead time t ∈ [0, 1] makes an AR. Since we consider only symmetric equilibria, all customers follow the same strategy function. Through conditioning, given that there are k other customers with normalized lead times t 1 , . . . , t k that follow strategy σ , the tagged customer can find his or her probability of getting service (we denote that event by S) for each action he or she chooses. The customer's probability to get service, when choosing action α ∈ {AR, AR }, is
(2) The first term in Equation (2) is the probability that the number of customers (besides the tagged customer) is smaller than N. In this case, all customers get service, regardless of their decisions. The second term is the weighted sum of the probabilities of getting service when the number of customers (besides the tagged customer) is at least N. In this case, the probability that the tagged customer gets service depends on his or her action and on the strategy followed by the other customers and their lead times (note that the PDF of the random variable t j equals 1, for each j ∈ {1, . . . , k}). As shown in the sequel, deriving an explicit expression for P (S|t, α, k, t 1 , . . . , t k , σ ) is not required for the equilibria analysis.
Given the model and strategy function followed by all other customers, one can express the expected payoff, denoted U σ (t, α), for each action α by multiplying P (S|ti, α, σ −i ) and 1 − P (S|ti, α, σ −i ) with the relevant payoffs, as summarized in Table I . For example, for the second model:
and
At equilibrium, each customer chooses an action that maximizes his or her expected payoff. Thus, we define an equilibrium strategy (i.e., a strategy that leads to equilibrium) as follows.
Definition 4.2. Strategy σ is an equilibrium strategy if the following holds for any normalized lead time t ∈ [0, 1]:
That is, at equilibrium, a customer chooses the action AR only if he or she is (weakly) better off not making AR; a customer randomizes his or her action only if he or she is indifferent between the two outcomes; and a customer chooses the action AR only if he or she is (weakly) better off making an AR.
Next we show that at equilibrium all customers follow the same threshold strategy, defined next. Definition 4.3. A threshold strategy has the following structure:
where τ is a threshold value in the interval (0, 1].
LEMMA 4.4. In the unobservable models, at equilibrium, all customers follow a threshold strategy.
PROOF. Consider a tagged customer with normalized lead time t and assume that the rest of the customers follow a strategy function σ . All customers that do not make an AR have the same probability to get service. Thus, U σ (t, AR ) does not depend on t. For brevity, we denote this value by β. From Lemma 4.1, we know that the expected payoff when making an AR U σ (t, AR) is a nondecreasing function of t. Hence, the two expected payoffs can intersect at most once.
If U σ (t, AR) < β for all t ∈ [0, 1], then σ is an equilibrium strategy only if none of the customers makes an AR (i.e., it is a threshold strategy with τ = 1). If U σ (t, AR) > β for all t ∈ [0, 1], then σ is an equilibrium strategy only if all customers make an AR (i.e., it is a threshold strategy with τ = 0). However, if all customers make an AR, a customer with normalized lead time 0 + has the same probability to get service with and without AR. Thus, he or she is better off not making an AR. Therefore, an equilibrium where all customers make an AR cannot exist.
Finally, if the two expected payoff functions intersect, they can intersect either at a single point t 0 or along an interval [t 2 , t 1 ]. In the first case, U σ (t, AR) < β for all t < t 0 and U σ (t, AR) > β for all t > t 0 . Thus, in this case, σ is an equilibrium strategy only if it is a threshold strategy with τ = t 0 .
In the second case, U σ (t, AR) has the same value for all t ∈ [t 2 , t 1 ], which can only happen if σ (t) = 0, ∀t ∈ [t 2 , t 1 ] (we ignore the case of σ (t) = 0 over a measure zero subset of [t 2 , t 1 ], since the probability that a customer will have a normalized lead time within this subset is zero). Since none of the customers makes an AR in the interval [t 2 , t 1 ], and since U σ (t, AR) < β for all t < t 2 and U σ (t, AR) > β for all t > t 1 , we conclude that σ is an equilibrium strategy only if it is a threshold strategy with τ = t 1 .
LEMMA 4.5. In the observable model, at equilibrium, all customers follow a threshold strategy.
PROOF. Suppose a customer is informed that a server is available. For this case, we show that the expected payoff of not making an AR is a nonincreasing function of the normalized lead time, while the payoff of making an AR is fixed to 1 − C. Using similar arguments as in the unobservable case, one can then show that the only possible equilibrium is a threshold strategy.
We defineD AR (t) as the number of reservations made before the normalized lead time t. We need to show that for any t 1 > t 2 , regardless of the strategy σ followed by the rest of the customers, the following holds:
where the left (right)-hand side is the probability of a customer with normalized lead time t 1 (t 2 ) to get service, given that the number of reservations made earlier (i.e., by customers with greater lead times) is smaller than N and the chosen action is AR . Using conditional probability, Equation (5) can be rewritten as
The event {S} is contained in the event {D AR (·) < N}. Moreover, under action AR , the probability to get service does not depend on the lead time. We deduce that the numerators on both sides of the previous equation are equal. SinceD AR (t 2 ) is stochastically larger or equal toD AR (t 1 ) when t 2 < t 1 , we deduce that the denominator of the right-hand side of Equation (6) is smaller than or equal to the denominator of the left-hand side of Equation (6). Thus, we have shown that Equation (5) holds.
After showing that a threshold strategy is the only possible equilibrium strategy, we distinguish between two types of equilibria.
Definition 4.6. None-make-AR is an equilibrium in which all customers follow a threshold strategy with threshold τ e = 1.
Definition 4.7. Some-make-AR is an equilibrium in which all customers follow a threshold strategy with threshold τ e ∈ (0, 1).
Using the results obtained so far, we find next the equilibria structure for each model separately.
Equilibria Structure
In this section, we show that different ranges of fees lead to different equilibria. The following theorem summarizes the main results. For simplicity, we do not consider the boundary cases C = C and C = C i in our discussion.
4.2.1. Unobservable Model 1. We consider the first unobservable model. For each type of equilibria, we determine the range of fees in which they may occur.
Some-make-AR equilibria. If all customers follow a strategy with threshold τ e , that strategy is an equilibrium strategy if and only if a customer with normalized lead time τ e (referred to as a threshold customer) is indifferent between the actions AR and AR . We denote by π AR (τe) the probability that a threshold customer gets service upon chosen action AR, and by π AR (τe) the probability that a threshold customer gets service upon chosen action AR . Hence, a strategy with threshold τ e is an equilibrium if and only if
where the left-hand side of Equation (7) is the expected payoff of AR and the right-hand side is the expected payoff of AR . Using Equation (7), we express the fee as a function of the threshold
Next, we develop the expressions π AR (τe) and π AR (τe). The former expression corresponds to the probability that either the demand is at most N or the demand exceeds N but fewer than N customers make an AR. The number of customers making an AR, givenD = j with j ≥ N, is a random variable that follows a binomial distribution. The number of trials is j and the success probability is 1 − τ e . The probability that the threshold customer gets service is equal to the probability that the number of successes is at most N − 1. By summing this probability over all possible values of j, we get
Likewise, we have
In that case, if the demand exceeds N but fewer than N customers make an AR, service is not guaranteed. Given a demand j and a number of reservations i, the probability to get service without an AR is the ratio of the number of unreserved servers N − i to the number of customers that did not make an AR, j + 1 − i. Next, we prove that these two functions are continuous. PROOF. Starting with Equation (9) and ignoring the first term of the function that does not depend on τ e , we need to show that the second term is continuous. The inner sum of the second term is continuous, since it is a finite sum of polynomial functions. To prove that the outer sum is continuous, we use Cauchy's uniform convergence criterion [Trench 2003 ]. We shall show that for any > 0, there exists an integer M such that
The previous expression is upper bounded by P(n ≤D ≤ m), which in turn is upper bounded by P(D ≥ n). For any discrete distribution and > 0, there exists M such that P(D ≥ n) < for any n > M. Thus, we have shown that Equation (11) holds true. Since, for any τ e ∈ [0, 1], π AR (τ e ) ≥ π AR (τ e ), the proof is also valid for π AR .
Since both π AR and π AR are continuous and positive in the range τ e ∈ [0, 1], we deduce that C 1 (τe) is a continuous function in this range. Next, we observe that if all customers make an AR, then the probability of service of a customer with lead time zero (i.e., the last arriving customer) does not depend on his or her decision. Hence, C 1 (0) = 0. In any other case, the probability to get service is greater when making an AR. Hence, C 1 (τe) > 0 for any 0 < τ e ≤ 1. We denote the supremum value of C 1 (τe) as
Since the equation C 1 (τ e ) = C has a solution if and only if C is smaller than the supremum value of C 1 (τ e ), we conclude that a some-make-AR equilibrium exists if C < C 1 and does not exist if C > C 1 .
None-make-AR equilibrium. If none of the customers makes an AR, all have the same expected payoff π AR (1). A customer that deviates gets service with probability π AR (1) = 1 and his or her payoff is 1 − C. Thus, if the provider chooses a fee such that 1 − C < π AR (1), then none of the customers will have an incentive to deviate. On the other hand, if 1 − C > π AR (1), then all the customers will have an incentive to deviate. By defining C C 1 (1), we conclude that if C > C, then a none-make-AR equilibrium exists. If C < C, then a none-make-AR equilibrium does not exist.
By definition, C 1 ≥ C. Therefore, we have shown that for any value of 0 < C < 1, at least one equilibrium exists. Furthermore, if the interval I = (C, C 1 ) is not empty (i.e., the supremum point is not reached at τ = 1), then for any C ∈ I, the equation C = C 1 (τe) must have at least two solutions due to the continuity of the function. Therefore, any fee C ∈ I has at least two different some-make-AR equilibria (the exact number of some-make-AR equilibria depends on the number of maximal points of the function C (τe)). See Figure 3 for an illustration.
Unobservable Model 2.
In this section, we show that the second game has the same equilibria structure as the first one, but with different ranges.
Some-make-AR equilibria. If all the customers follow a strategy with threshold τ e , the probability to get service with or without making an AR is calculated in the same way as in the previous model. Thus, the functions π AR and π AR can also be used in the analysis of this model. As in the first game, at a some-make-AR equilibrium, the threshold customer is indifferent between the two actions AR and AR . Thus, where the left-hand side of the equation is the expected payoff of AR, while the righthand side is the expected payoff AR . In this model, the fee as a function of the threshold is
We define
C 2 (τe). (15) As is the first model, C 2 (0) = 0 and C 2 (τe) > 0 for any τ e > 0. Thus, a some-make-AR equilibrium exists if C < C 2 and does not exist if C > C 2 . None-make-AR equilibrium. If none of the customers makes an AR, then the expected payoffs of not making an AR and the expected payoff of deviating are the same as in the first model. Therefore, the range of fees that have a none-make-AR equilibrium is the same as in the first model.
In conclusion, the difference between the analyses of the two games is that C 1 may be different from C 2 . From Equations (8) and (14), we obtain
, ∀τ e ∈ (0, 1).
In any some-make-AR equilibrium, the probability to get service is smaller than one. Hence, for any τ e ∈ (0, 1), C 1 > C 2 (as illustrated in Figure 4 ). This result indicates that if the provider is aiming to achieve a certain fraction of customers making AR, he or she will have to advertise a lower fee if using the second model.
Observable
Model. In this model, customers make decisions not only based on statistical information but also based on the knowledge that a server is currently available at the desired slot. Next, we show that this additional information has no effect on decisions of customers and each fee leads to the same set of equilibria as in the first unobservable model. Some-make-AR equilibrium. Consider the first model and a some-make-AR equilibrium with threshold τ e , but assume that the threshold customer is being informed that a server is available, namely,D AR (τ e ) < N. If making an AR, his or her payoff is 1 − C. The expected payoff of not making an AR is P(S|τ e ,D AR (τ e ) < N, AR ), which is the probability of the threshold customer to get service, given that all customers follow a strategy with threshold τ e , there is at least one free server, and the decision AR . Next, we show that
By conditioning on the event {D AR (τ e ) < N}, we get
Since a customer cannot get service when observing no free servers, the numerator P(S, D AR (τ e ) < N|τ e , AR ) is equal to P(S|τ e , AR ), which is equal by definition to π AR (τ e ).
The denominator P(D AR (τ e ) < N|τ e , AR ) is the probability that the threshold customer will see the event {D AR (τ e ) < N} (the fact that he or she does not make an AR is irrelevant). This in turn can be rephrased as the probability to get service when making an AR exactly at the threshold point without knowing if there are free servers, which is the definition of π AR (τ e ). Thus, P(D AR (τ e ) < N|τ e , AR ) = π AR (τ e ).
We have shown that Equation (17) holds true for any τ e . Using Equation (7), we deduce that the threshold customer stays indifferent between the two actions after being informed that a server is available. Hence, we conclude that if a threshold strategy is an equilibrium strategy in the first model, it is also an equilibrium strategy in the third model.
None-make-AR equilibrium. If none of the customers makes an AR, the expected payoffs of not making an AR and the expected payoff of deviating are the same as in the first and second models. Therefore, the range of fees that have a none-make-AR equilibrium is the same as in the other two models.
By noticing that the profit of the provider is defined in the same way in both models, that is, the number of customers that make an AR and being served multiplied by the fee C, we obtain the following: THEOREM 4.10. In AR games, if AR fees are charged only from served customers, then informing customers that servers are available or hiding this information leads to the same equilibria.
PROFIT MAXIMIZATION
In this section, we compare between the maximum possible expected profits in the two unobservable models. We define the maximum possible profit for model i = 1, 2 as
Under some-make-AR equilibrium with threshold τ e , the number of reservations is D AR (τe), or simply D AR from now on. In the first model, the expected profit per server is the expected number of reserved servers multiplied by the fee and normalized by the number of servers N:
In the second model, it is the expected number of reservations multiplied by the fee and normalized by N:
By comparing the two expressions, we state the following result:
THEOREM 5.1. In AR games, the maximum possible profit, at equilibrium, is greater when charging the AR fee only from customers that get service and not from all customers that make AR requests.
PROOF. We prove the theorem by showing that for any given threshold, the first model yields greater profit than the second. Namely, we show that for any value of τ e ∈ (0, 1), the following holds:
From Equations (20), (21), and (16), we obtain that showing that R 1 (τ e ) > R 2 (τ e ) is equivalent to showing that
First, we expand the first term of Equation (23):
The PDF of D AR is
Combining Equations (24) and (25), we get
Next, we expand π AR (τe):
The explanation for Equation (27) is as follows. We start from Equation (9). We merge the two terms in Equation (9) and substitute P(D = j) by the right-hand side of Equation (1). Next, we replace j by j − 1 and start the sum at j = i instead of j = i + 1. Next, we do a similar change with the variable i. Finally, we multiply and divide the expression by j i . In the next step, we multiply both sides of Equation (27) 
Finally, we substitute the first term of the left-hand side of Equation (23) with the righthand side of Equation (26) and the second term of the left-hand side of Equation (23) with the right-hand side of Equation (28). We then get
which completes the proof.
The result of Theorem 5.1 is reassuring, since a mechanism that charges reservation fees only from customers getting service (first model) appears as more fair than a mechanism that charges reservation fees from all customers making AR requests (second model). Further, one may argue that the demand for service would decrease when under the latter charging scheme. The theorem proves that the latter scheme is detrimental for the provider even if the demand for service were not reduced.
PRICE OF CONSERVATISM
In the previous sections, we showed that in order to maximize the profit, the provider should choose the first or the third model, which yield the same profit for any given fee. In this section, we assume that the first model is chosen and investigate different fees and their impact on the profit.
By means of example, we next show that the fee that maximizes the profit may yield more than one equilibrium, where one of them yields zero profit. If the fee that yields the maximum possible profit is not unique, the provider may prefer a fee with smaller but guaranteed profit. In order to weigh the different options, we propose the metric of price of conservatism (PoC). In the rest of this section, we formally define the term PoC and derive it for different settings. Since we only deal with the first model, the model index is removed in this section.
In order to have a positive guaranteed profit, the provider must choose a fee smaller than C. Furthermore, if that fee has more than one equilibrium, then the guaranteed profit is defined as the minimum between the profits of the different some-make-AR equilibria. We define Z C as the set of some-make-AR equilibria of the fee C, namely, Z C = {τ e : C(τ e ) = C, 0 < τ e < 1}. The maximum expected guaranteed profit is defined as follows:
The following definition captures the potential profit loss resulting from a conservative pricing decision.
Definition 6.2. The price of conservatism is the ratio of the expected maximum possible profit R * to the expected maximum guaranteed profit R * g .
Next, we evaluate the provider's profit and PoC under the assumption that the demand D is a Poisson random variable with parameter λ. We denote the number of customers not making an AR by D AR . Due to the properties of Poisson games [Myerson 1998 ], D AR and D AR are independent Poisson random variables with parameter λ (1 − τ e) and λτ e , respectively. Furthermore, the total number of customers and the number of customers making each action, as seen by a customer if not counting himself or herself, has the same distributions as D, D AR and D AR , respectively. 
Single-Server Case
We start with the special case N = 1. If all customers follow a strategy with threshold τ e , the probability that the threshold customer will get service is as follows:
(1) If making an AR:
which is the probability that besides the customer with lead time equal to the threshold, no one makes an AR (i.e., the lead times of all other customers are smaller than the threshold). (2) If not making an AR:
−λτ e (λτe)
which is the probability that none of the customers makes an AR multiplied by the probability to get service given that none of the customers makes an AR.
By substituting Equations (31) and (32) in Equation (8), we get
LEMMA 6.3. For the case N = 1, C (τe) is a monotonic increasing function in the interval τ e ∈ (0, 1). 
PROOF. The derivative of C (τe) is
∂C
Since λτ 2 e ≥ 0, e −λτ e ≥ 0, and e λτ e − 1 − λτ e > 0 for any λ > 0 and τ e ∈ (0, 1), we conclude that
From the lemma, we infer that C = C (1). Thus, by definition:
Therefore, for any fee smaller than C, there is no none-make-AR equilibrium. Furthermore, for any value of C between zero and C, the equation C = C (τe) has a single solution and therefore the some-make-AR equilibrium is unique. The result is stated in the following theorem.
THEOREM 6.4. In a single-server system, the equilibrium is unique and its type is:
The expected profit R (τe) in the case N = 1 is equal to the probability that at least one customer makes an AR multiplied by the fee: Since the equilibrium is unique, the provider will maximize his or her expected profit by choosing C * = C τ * e , where τ * e = arg max 0<τ e <1 R (τe).
Due to the uniqueness of the equilibrium,
. Hence: COROLLARY 6.5. In a single-server system, the price of conservatism is 1. Example 6.6. We consider a system with N = 1 server and average demand λ = 1.2. For this system, the maximum fee that leads to a some-make-AR equilibrium is C = 0.417. The optimal fee is obtained when τ * e = 0.523 (i.e., when on average 47.7% of the customers make an AR). This threshold is achieved when the provider sets a fee C * = 0.257. The provider's expected profit in this case is R(τ * e ) = 0.112. Figure 6 shows the fee and profit as functions of the threshold τ e .
Many-Server Case
In this section, we study the behavior of the system when the number of servers goes to infinity. We distinguish between overloaded and underloaded systems.
6.2.1. Overloaded System. We start with an overloaded system and we show that the PoC is a function of the ratio between the average demand and the number of servers. THEOREM 6.7. In an overloaded many-server system, where λ = α N and α > 1, the following holds:
Hence,
PROOF. In order to prove Equation (38), we show that if the fee approaches one from below, there is a some-make-AR equilibrium where almost all servers are reserved.
Let τ e = 1 − 1/α, and hence D AR is Poisson distributed with parameter N. The probability that the threshold customer gets service is equivalent to the probability that D AR will be smaller than N, which in turn is equal to
Next, we show that when τ e = 1 − 1/α, the probability to get service if not making an AR tends to zero as N → ∞. First, recall Chebyshev's inequality, which states that for any random variable X and real positive number Q,
Setting Q = δ √ N, where δ is a positive real number, we get from Equation (42)
In the same way, setting Q = (α − 1) N, where is a positive real number, we get
From Equations (43) and (45), we deduce that with probability one the number of free servers
Hence, for any α > 1, as N → ∞, a customer that does not make an AR will get service with probability zero.
We showed that when N → ∞ and τ e is such that on average N customers make an AR, the expected payoff of the threshold customer tends to 0.5(1 − C) if making an AR and to zero if not making an AR. Thus, a strategy with threshold τ e is an equilibrium only if C tends to one. Therefore, we conclude that there exists a value of τ e such that on average, N customers make an AR while the fee is almost one. Therefore, in an overloaded system:
Next, we show that Equation (39) holds. If none of the customers makes an AR, they all have the same probability to get service. Again, due to Chebyshev's inequality, for any δ > 1, the following holds:
In other words, with probability one, the demand is α N + O( √ N). In this case, as N → ∞, the fraction of customers getting service converges to 1/α. Hence,
On the other hand, when deviating from the none-make-AR strategy, the probability to get service is π AR (1) = 1. Thus,
Next, we show that in the overloaded system, if C < C, then in any some-make-AR equilibrium, almost all servers are reserved. By contradiction, we assume that there exists a some-make-AR equilibrium with threshold τ e such that C(τ e ) < 1 − 1/α and E[D AR ] = δ N, where 0 < δ < 1. In this case, the probability of the threshold customer to get service if making an AR converges to one as N → ∞. Thus, his or her expected payoff is greater than 1/α. If not making an AR, his or her probability to get service is smaller than 1/α (which is the probability to get service if none makes an AR). Therefore, the expected payoff of the threshold customer is greater if making an AR than if not making an AR, which contradicts the definition of a some-make-AR equilibrium. Hence, we have shown that the assumption cannot hold true. Thus, with probability one, the number of reservations will be at least N + o (N). Therefore, with probability one, the ratio between the number of free servers and the number of servers is zero. The provider will maximize his or her guaranteed profit by advertising a fee just below C and we finally obtain
The results indicate that if α is almost one and none of the customers makes an AR, then, in order to persuade customers to deviate, the provider will have to advertise a fee close to zero. Such a fee will yield almost zero profit per resource. In other words, although there is an equilibrium that yields a profit per resource of almost one, if initially none of the customers makes an AR, any fee the provider will advertise will not significantly increase his or her profit.
6.2.2. Underloaded System. In an underloaded many-server system, we show that any fee leads to an asymptotically zero profit. 
PROOF. Given any α < 1 and any > 0, we can find a large enough N such that
In other words, for large enough N, the probability that the demand will exceed the number of servers tends to zero. In this case, the dominant strategy of all customers, regardless of their lead time, is not to make an AR. Hence,
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this article, we introduce advance reservation games: games where customers are asked to pay a fee if they wish to reserve a future resource in advance. First, we show that, at equilibrium, either all customers with lead times greater than some threshold make an AR or none of them makes an AR. Next, we prove the existence of at least one Nash equilibrium and find the range of fees that determine each equilibrium. Furthermore, we show that a fee may yield more than one equilibrium, with one of them bringing zero profit to the provider. Next, we show that providing information to the customers about the availability of servers has no impact on the game outcome. However, charging a fee from all customers attempting to reserve a server can only reduce the provider's profits. In order for a provider to decide on a proper AR fee, we propose the concept of price of conservatism (PoC) , which corresponds to the ratio of the maximum possible expected profit to the maximum guaranteed expected profit. A greater PoC indicates greater potential profit loss if the provider opts to be conservative. We focus on the models where charges are collected only from the customers getting service and assume that the demand is Poisson distributed. First, we show that in a single-server system, the equilibrium is unique. Thus, PoC = 1 and the provider experiences no loss. Next, we show that in an overloaded many-server system where the average demand is λ = α N with α > 1, the maximum possible expected profit tends to one, while the maximum guaranteed expected profit tends to 1 − 1/α as N → ∞. Hence, PoC = α/(α − 1), which increases in an unbounded fashion as α approaches one from above. Finally, we show that in an underloaded many-server system, the provider cannot make a profit.
The extensions of advance reservation games to more complex settings (e.g., with users differing in their utilities) and analysis of PoC in other systems represent interesting directions for future work.
